Widespread pessimism about labour market prospects has been fuelled by a recent fall in the stock of vacancies accompanied by a rise in claimant-count unemployment, as well as looming public sector job cuts.

Strong GDP growth in the second and third quarters, however, suggests that labour demand should be picking up. Such a scenario is supported by the Monster employment index, which tallies vacancies posted on corporate career sites and job boards. The index tracks or leads the official vacancies series and rose further in October, reaching its highest seasonally-adjusted level since December 2008 – see first chart.

Recent consumer survey evidence is also reassuring. Despite media negativity, the net percentage of respondents expecting unemployment to rise has fallen back after a post-election spike and is far below the recession peak in January 2009 – second chart.

The OBR forecasts a fall of 610,000 in general government jobs but this is scheduled to occur over five years – the projected reduction by March 2012 is only 60,000. Overall employment rose impressively during the 1990s despite a larger public sector decline – third chart.

Chinese consumer prices rose by an annual 4.4% in October as food price inflation accelerated to 10.1%, in line with a forecast made in a post a month ago.

The first chart shows the CPI for food together with a weekly index of product prices that was suspended in early October, perhaps because food inflation was becoming politically sensitive. Global prices – as measured by the CRB spot foodstuffs index – have stabilised in recent weeks. This and official price suppression efforts may prevent a further rise in annual CPI food inflation in November.

Looking further ahead, the CPI for food rose steeply between November 2009 and February 2010, implying a possible fall in annual inflation by early 2011. It is normal, however, for price increases to accelerate into Chinese New Year and global pressures may persist as the Federal Reserve moves ahead with "QE2". CPI food inflation, in other words, may stabilise at around the current level but is unlikely to fall much.

Headline CPI inflation, meanwhile, could rise further as other prices accelerate. The non-food CPI rose by only 1.6% in the year to October but correlates with producer prices, which are picking up. Surging input costs suggest that the annual PPI increase will climb to 10%, in which case non-food CPI inflation could reach 2.5% – second and third charts. Assuming no change in food inflation, this would push the headline CPI rate up to about 5% (food has a one-third weight in the basket).

The November Inflation Report suggests that the MPC is badly split and unlikely to be able to muster a majority for action – in either direction – for the foreseeable future. In a now-familiar routine, the Bank has been forced to raise its near-term inflation forecast significantly but continues to project an eventual decline to the 2% target, based on a “neo-Keynesian” model emphasising the “output gap” and fiscal tightening. The alternative “monetarist” view that persistent inflation overshoots reflect an excess of the supply of money over the demand to hold it – with demand depressed by the Bank’s imposition of negative real interest rates – is ignored.

Observations:

• The MPC's bias is summarised by its mean forecast for inflation in two years' time based on unchanged policies – a sub-target figure signals an inclination to ease and vice versa. The forecast was 2.0% in August and looks unchanged in November, based on the fan chart (the Bank refuses to publish the numbers until a week after the Report). So policy remains stuck in neutral despite recent upside growth and inflation surprises. (The gilt market, bizarrely, was discounting a shift to an easing bias, judging from today's sell-off.)

• CPI inflation is now expected to rise further to about 3.5% in the first quarter of 2011 compared with a forecast of 3.0% in the August Report, reflecting commodity price gains and a weaker exchange rate. It remains at or above the 3.1% letter-writing threshold until late 2011, implying that Governor King will have to wheel out his "temporary shocks" argument in at least four further missives to the Chancellor (including one next week following the October CPI report).

• The 3.5% first-quarter forecast is above consensus but probably still too low – a previous post suggested a rise to about 4% by early 2011 based on high VAT pass-through and transmission of recent food and energy commodity price increases.

• The GDP growth forecast looks little changed from August, implying a mean expectation for 2011 expansion of about 2.5% compared with the OBR's 2.3% assumption, i.e. not materially different. Claims that the Bank is significantly more optimistic based on its modal forecast are wrong, ignoring a downward risk skew. The OBR is hardly a fount of wisdom, with its June projection of 1.2% growth in 2010 far below a likely outturn of 1.8%.

• In a press conference reply, Governor King claimed that the MPC is required to set policy to achieve 2% inflation in two or three years' time but the remit states that the target applies "at all times" and makes no reference to the exclusion of "temporary shocks". The November Report mean forecast implies that consumer prices will rise by more than 2.5% per annum over the coming two years.

• The September level of the CPI was 3.2% higher than if the Bank had achieved 2% inflation since the target was switched from RPIX in December 2003. The Bank's forecast implies that this overshoot will increase further, to about 4.5% by the end of 2012. Has inflation targeting become meaningless?

Previous posts highlighted a widening monetary divergence within the Eurozone, with real narrow money M1 still growing solidly in "core" economies (i.e. Germany, France, Benelux and Austria) while contracting the "periphery" (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland). The latter trend suggested renewed economic weakness that would undermine fiscal consolidation plans.

Industrial output numbers for September are consistent with the theme, showing modest pay-back for August strength in the core but more pronounced weakness in the periphery. With several countries still to publish, core output probably fell by 0.5% on the month versus a 2% decline in the periphery. This would imply that peripheral output is now below its level six months ago – see first chart.

With real M1 contraction accelerating, economic news in the periphery is likely to continue to worsen into early 2011.

More US banks eased credit standards on commercial and industrial (C&I) lending than tightened in the three months to October, according to the latest Federal Reserve senior loan officer survey. The net easing percentage leads economic activity and the latest reading is consistent with solid US expansion in early 2011, a prospect also signalled by recent monetary trends – see first chart and previous post. (The chart shows an average of separate series covering lending to larger and small firms.)

Further evidence of improving loan supply is provided by the October National Federation of Independent Business survey, showing a fall in the net percentage of small firms describing credit as hard to get to its lowest level since August 2008 – second chart.

While supply is easing, loan demand remains weak, reflecting ample corporate free cash flow and more attractive borrowing opportunities for larger companies in credit markets. The net percentage of banks reporting stronger C&I loan demand fell back in October and remains in negative territory, although far above last year's low and at a level historically consistent with stable or modestly-expanding lending – third and fourth charts.

A post in July argued that global industrial momentum would revive in late 2010 in lagged response to faster growth of G7 real narrow money M1 since the spring. Last week's manufacturing purchasing managers' surveys for October were supportive, showing the first improvement in new orders since April – see first chart.

The acceleration in G7 real M1 has stalled recently, though growth remains respectable – second chart. The message is that global economic expansion will continue but at a slower pace than from mid 2009 and mid 2010, when industrial output staged a V-shaped recovery. Such a scenario would maintain the resemblance of the current global upswing to that following the first oil crisis recession of 1974-75 – third chart.

What could go wrong? As previously discussed, one risk is that higher commodity prices stemming in part from US "QE2" lift G7 inflation and deflate real M1 expansion, as well as forcing further monetary tightening in overheated emerging economies.

Within the G7, real M1 growth has picked up strongly in the US while continuing to slow in the Eurozone – fourth chart. Until recently, economic news has tended to surprise positively in the Eurozone while disappointing in the US but this trend should now reverse, lending support to the US dollar versus the euro.

In early evidence of such a shift, last week's US PMIs were stronger than expected and better than those in the Eurozone. Payrolls and vehicle sales numbers were also upbeat. By contrast, German manufacturing orders fell by more than expected, albeit following significant strength. As expected given monetary weakness, there was further bad news from the periphery in the form of weaker Spanish industrial output – fifth chart – and a slump in Irish consumer expectations – final chart.