The table below provides further evidence that money leads credit around the trough of the economic cycle.

The table dates the lows in the six-month rates of change of UK M4 and M4 lending around the recession troughs in the mid 1970s, early 1980s and early 1990s. Money bottomed about a year before credit in all three cases.

Six-month M4 growth – on the Bank of England's adjusted measure – appears to have troughed in the fourth quarter of 2008. Based on the historical lead, bank lending could remain weak until late 2009 / early 2010.

Providing recent faster money growth is sustained, an economic recovery can coexist with ongoing lacklustre credit trends. Lending constraints could become an issue as the upswing develops but by that stage banks' balance sheets and risk appetite may have improved significantly. 

A simplistic monetarist view is that countries with higher rates of inflation-adjusted money supply growth should experience stronger economic and equity market performance.

The first chart shows six-month changes in real broad money across the major developed economies. At the start of 2009, real money trends were much stronger in the US, Canada and Australia than in Japan and Europe.

The second chart shows year-to-date equity market performance for the same group of countries, including the impact of currency fluctuations and expressed relative to the World index. As suggested by money supply growth, Canada and Australia have outperformed significantly, while Japan and Europe ex. the UK have lagged the global average.

China is not included in the charts. Its monetary growth and equity market performance have been stronger than in any of the developed countries shown.

The main deviation from the monetarist relationship so far this year has been the relative weakness of the US stock market, despite monetary strength in late 2008 / early 2009. This may partly reflect a drag from much heavier equity issuance than in other markets. US relative performance could improve as issuance abates, although the monetary backdrop is less favourable than at the start of 2009 – see earlier post.

Real money growth has accelerated in the UK and to a lesser extent Japan since early 2009 while slowing in the Eurozone – first chart. Since the start of the second quarter, UK equities have outperformed the other markets with the exception of Canada. Assuming that monetary trends continue to benefit from QE, UK relative gains could be sustained during the second half.

As reported in today’s FT, British Bankers’ Association (BBA) figures for May show a £200 million fall in sterling lending to private non-financial companies. The report states that “a key objective of the Bank of England’s “quantitative easing” programme ... is to encourage more private sector lending”, suggesting that the Bank will be disappointed by the BBA news.

Three points are worth noting. First, a £200 million decline is insignificant, amounting to 0.07% of outstanding BBA member lending to private non-financial companies. Moreover, the BBA statistics cover only 65% of total loans by UK-based banks to non-financial firms, according to Bank of England data. The flow of total lending exceeded the BBA flow by an average of £500 million per month over the six months to April. (The Bank will publish its May data on 29 June.)

Secondly, the key objective of QE is to boost the money supply not lending, although credit trends should revive if the policy succeeds in generating an economic recovery. The Bank of England’s website explanation of QE places money rather than credit at the centre of the transmission mechanism:

Asset purchases increase the supply of money directly into the wider economy which should boost spending. ... The seller of an asset to the Bank can spend the new money it receives on goods and services which directly adds to overall spending or it can purchase other assets which will tend to boost asset prices more broadly and provide an indirect spur to spending.

Thirdly, to monitor the impact of QE, the MPC has stated that it will pay close attention to “the growth rate of broad money, the cost and availability of corporate borrowing, measures of inflation and inflation expectations, and developments in nominal spending growth”. The list does not include the volume of bank lending to companies, because the MPC recognises that lending weakness may reflect demand factors rather than supply constraints – including firms choosing to raise funds from markets rather than the banks.

The MPC will be encouraged by recent faster money growth, higher corporate equity and bond issuance and signs of a stabilisation in inflation expectations and nominal spending. In assessing the extent of improvement in the “cost and availability of corporate borrowing”, the Committee is likely to place high weight on its second-quarter Credit Conditions Survey, released on 2 July.

Bank of England gilt purchases have contributed to a pick-up in UK broad money growth. In the US, however, M2 expansion has slowed since early 2009, despite ongoing large-scale bond-buying by the Federal Reserve – see first chart. What explains this divergence?

Central bank lending or asset buying has a direct positive impact on the broad money supply only when transactions are conducted with domestic non-banks. One possible explanation for the UK / US monetary divergence is that the Bank of England has been buying securities from non-banks while the Fed has been buying from banks.

Available evidence, however, does not support this interpretation. For example, US flow of funds accounts for the first quarter show that Fed purchases of agency and mortgage-backed securities were more than accounted for by sales by the household sector (which includes domestic hedge funds). Commercial banks' holdings of such securities were little changed last quarter.

Rather than ineffective bond purchases, the US M2 slowdown appears to reflect two other factors absent in the UK. First, commercial bank credit has contracted by 3% (not annualised) since December 2008. By contrast, UK M4 lending rose by about 2% between December and May (based on the Bank of England's adjusted measure excluding transactions with financial intermediaries).

Secondly, the monetary impact of the Fed's bond-buying has been offset by a contraction of its liquidity swap lending to other central banks. Swaps ballooned in late 2008 as policy-makers sought to alleviate an international shortage of dollars. Some of the cash is likely to have flowed back to the US, contributing to faster M2 growth late last year. This process has reversed in 2009: liquidity swap lending has contracted by $405 billion since the start of the year – almost as large as the Fed's $487 billion combined purchases of Treasuries, agencies, mortgage-backed securities and commercial paper.

As well as contributing to the slowdown in broad money M2, the fall in swap lending has neutralised the impact of the Fed's bond purchases on the monetary base M0 (i.e. currency plus bank reserves), which has been static since the start of the year. In the UK, however, M0 has surged since the Bank of England embarked on QE, with annual growth recently overtaking the US – second chart.

Slower M2 growth, should it persist, is a threat to US economic prospects but there are grounds for expecting an improvement. Recent credit weakness partly reflects heavy destocking, which is now coming to an end. Similarly, the contraction in the Fed's swap lending is probably largely complete – the amount outstanding is down to $149 billion from a December peak of $583 billion. As these drags abate, monetary trends should be dominated by the positive impact of ongoing Fed securities purchases.