A pick-up in US narrow money momentum is a hopeful signal for 2025 but requires confirmation and does not preclude near-term economic deterioration.

The measure of narrow money tracked here (M1A, comprising currency in circulation and demand deposits) rose by 0.8% in August, pushing six-month annualised growth up to 10.5% – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The broad M2+ measure (which adds large time deposits at commercial banks and institutional money funds to the official M2 aggregate) also rose solidly in August, by 0.5%, but six-month growth remains subdued and within the recent range, at 3.5% annualised.

Six-month expansion of official M1 is weaker, at 2.1%. M1 is no longer a narrow money measure, following its redefinition in 2020 to include savings accounts.

Narrow money outperforms broad as a leading indicator of economic direction. The recent pick-up suggests that demand and activity will be gaining momentum by mid-2025. It does not, however, preclude – and may be consistent with – current economic deterioration.

Six-month narrow money momentum similarly recovered from negative to 10% annualised in September 2001 and September 2008. In both cases, the economy was within a recession that the NBER had yet to recognise.

Those narrow money rebounds may have partly reflected a rise in liquidity preference associated with an increase in saving, i.e. they may have been a signal of a reduction in current demand. They also, however, implied potential for future economic reacceleration when liquidity preference normalised and money balances were redeployed.

The 2001 / 2008 experiences were atypical: in earlier recessions, six-month narrow money growth rose strongly only at the end of – or after – the period of economic contraction.

A reasonable assessment, therefore, is that a pick-up in narrow money momentum is a neutral or negative signal for current economic momentum but positive for prospects six to 12 months ahead.

The current positive message is tempered by several considerations.

First, six-month momentum is likely to fall back in September / October because of negative base effects: narrow money rose by a whopping 3.1% (20.0% annualised) in March / April combined.

Secondly, the currency and demand deposit components of narrow money have been individually correlated with future activity historically but the recent pick-up has been solely due to the latter, with currency momentum unusually weak – chart 1.

Thirdly, the Fed funds target rate had been cut by 350 bp and 325 bp respectively by the time six-month narrow money momentum reached 10% annualised in 2001 and 2008. The Fed’s tardiness has increased the risk of a monetary relapse.

Chinese money / credit trends remain weak but could be at a turning point.

Six-month rates of change of broad money and total social financing have stabilised above June lows – see chart 1. (Broad money here refers to M2 excluding money holdings of financial institutions, which are volatile and less informative about economic prospects.)

Chart 1

Narrow money is contracting at a record pace but has been distorted by regulatory changes in April that have reduced the attractiveness of demand deposits, resulting in enterprises shifting into time deposits and money substitutes while repaying some short-term bank borrowing. (The “true M1” measure shown adds household demand deposits to the published M1 aggregate to align with international monetary convention.)

Chart 2 compares six-month rates of change of the raw narrow money series and two adjusted measures. The first assumes that the share of demand deposits in total bank deposits of non-financial enterprises would have remained at its March level in the absence of the regulatory changes. The second additionally adds the inflow to instant-access wealth management products (WMPs) since end-March (data sourced from CICC), on the assumption that this represents a transfer from demand deposits. Six-month momentum of the latter measure was similar in July to the series low reached at end-2014.

Chart 2

A key reason for expecting money / credit reacceleration is that the yen rally has relieved pressure on the RMB, easing monetary conditions directly and opening up space for further PBoC policy action. The balance of payments turnaround is confirmed by a swing in the banking system’s net f/x transactions, including forwards, from sales of $58 billion in July to purchases of $10 billion in August. This series captures covert intervention via state banks (h/t Brad Setser) and an August reversal had been suggested by a sharp narrowing of the forward discount on the offshore RMB, which has remained lower so far in September – chart 3.

Chart 3

Actual and expected monetary easing has been reflected in a further steepening of the yield curve, which has correlated with, and sometimes led, money momentum historically – chart 4.

Chart 4

An easing of Chinese monetary conditions coupled with the start of a Fed rate-cutting cycle could have a powerful monetary impact in Hong Kong, where six-month momentum of local-currency M1 recently returned to positive territory, having reached its weakest level since the Asian crisis in October 2022 – chart 5.

Chart 5

Monetary considerations argue that the ECB’s latest inflation forecast, like earlier projections, will be undershot.

Annual growth of broad money – as measured by non-financial M3 – returned to its pre-pandemic (i.e. 2015-19) average of 4.8% in October 2022. Allowing for a typical two-year lead, this suggested that annual CPI inflation would return to about 2% in late 2024 – see chart 1. The August reading was 2.1% (ECB seasonally-adjusted measure).

Chart 1

The ECB staff forecast in December 2022 was more pessimistic, projecting annual inflation of 3.3% in Q4 2024. The forecast for that quarter was still up at 2.9% in June 2023 after natural gas prices had collapsed.

Annual broad money growth continued to plunge in 2023, reaching a low just above zero in November, since recovering to a paltry 2.5%. Simplistic monetarism, therefore, suggests that inflation will move below target in 2025 and remain there into 2026 – chart 2.

Chart 2

The September 2024 ECB staff forecast, by contrast, shows inflation rising in Q4 and remaining above 2% until Q4 2025.

The monetarist relationship, taken at face value, implies a period of annual price deflation in H2 2025 / H1 2026. The judgement here is to downplay this possibility and regard the current monetary signal as directional rather than giving strong guidance about levels.

It is possible that the stock of money is still above an “equilibrium” level relative to nominal GDP. The current ratio is below its 2000-19 trend but in line with the 2010-19 trend, and higher than at end-2019 – chart 3. There may still be “excess” money to act as a deflation cushion.

Chart 3

The forecast of a target undershoot requires services inflation – an annual 4.2% in August – to break lower. The price expectations balance in the EU services survey has displayed a (loose) leading relationship with annual services inflation historically, with the current reading consistent with a move down to about 2.5% in H1 2025 – chart 4.

Chart 4

The “double dip” downturn in global manufacturing continued last month.

Global manufacturing PMI new orders fell steeply from a peak in May 2021 to a trough in December 2022 (first dip), with a subsequent recovery ending in May 2024. The second dip was confirmed by a sharp fall to below 50 in July, with the index unchanged in August – see chart 1.

Chart 1

As the chart shows, an alternative global indicator based on national surveys weakened further last month.

The alternative indicator implies a shorter interim recovery between the two dips than the PMI, starting from May 2023 and ending in January 2024. These timings align better with turning points in global six-month real narrow money momentum (low in June 2022, high in December 2022) – chart 2.

Chart 2

The September 2023 low in real money momentum suggests that the double dip will bottom out by end-2024.

A key issue is whether manufacturing weakness will now transfer to services.

Services indicators remain mixed. The global services PMI new business index regained its May high last month and is close to the pre-pandemic average – chart 3.

Chart 3

Order backlogs, however, fell further and are well below the corresponding average, as they are in manufacturing – chart 4. The decline suggests that current output is running above the (increased) level of incoming demand.

Chart 4

Accordingly, services firms are curbing hiring, with the sector employment index falling sharply in August and almost as weak as in manufacturing – chart 5.

Chart 5

Rises in the global services PMI activity and new business indices last month partly reflected further strength in US components. The corresponding measures in the US ISM services survey are weaker, however, especially relative to pre-pandemic averages – chart 6.

Chart 6

The PMI surveys continue to support the expectation here of rapid easing of services price pressures and likely inflation undershoots by H1 2025. Output price indices for consumer goods and services remain close to their 2015-19 averages, a period when G7 annual core CPI inflation averaged 1.6% – chart 7.

Chart 7

Global six-month real narrow money momentum is estimated to have moved sideways for a fourth month in July at a weak level by historical standards – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The baseline scenario here remains that global economic momentum – proxied by the global manufacturing PMI new orders index – will move down into late 2024, echoing a fall in real money momentum into September last year. Based on more recent monetary data, a subsequent recovery may prove limited, with weakness persisting well into H1 2025.

The unchanged July global real money momentum reading conceals a rise in the US offset by further weakness in China. The E7 ex. China component also cooled, while G7 ex. US momentum remained negative, moving sideways – chart 2.

Chart 2

The Chinese series incorporates an adjustment* for a recent portfolio shift by non-financial enterprises from demand to time deposits in response to a regulatory change (a clampdown on payment of supplementary interest by banks). Chinese momentum would be significantly more negative without this adjustment, while the global series would be at its weakest level since February. (The adjustment may, however, underestimate the negative distortion to Chinese narrow money.)

Chart 3 shows additional DM detail. Real narrow money momentum is relatively strong in Canada and Australia as well as the US.

Chart 3

Japan moved deeper into negative territory but recent weakness partly reflects f/x intervention, so may abate.

Real money momentum is higher in the UK than the Eurozone but the difference is small, with both still negative. Recent UK economic outperformance is unlikely to last.

The pick-up in US real narrow money momentum suggests improving economic prospects but confirmation is required and lags should be respected.

The US July reading was boosted by a favourable base effect – narrow money contracted by 0.6% month-on-month in January. The base effect remains favourable for August but turns significantly negative in September / October.

Six-month growth of US broad money is weaker than for narrow and has edged lower since May, though hasn’t yet fallen to the extent suggested by a contractionary shift in the joint influence of Treasury financing operations and Fed QT, discussed previously. The latest Treasury financing projections imply that this influence will turn expansionary again in Q4.

For perspective, US six-month real narrow money momentum had recovered to the current level in September 2008 as the financial crisis was reaching a crescendo with the recession having nine more months to run. In the prior 2001 recession, the current level was reached three months before the economy hit bottom. In both cases, the NBER business cycle dating committee had yet to determine that a recession had begun.

*The adjustment assumes that the share of demand deposits in total bank deposits of non-financial enterprises would have been stable at its March level in the absence of the regulatory change. The adjustment does not take into account any shift from bank deposits to non-monetary instruments (e.g. wealth management products) or effects on other money-holders.