US Treasury yields have risen sharply since Fed Chair Powell’s signal last week of a likely tapering decision at the November or December FOMC meeting. The move higher mainly reflects an increase in real yields, with inflation break-evens range-bound – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The reaction recalls a surge in nominal and real yields when former Chair Bernanke signalled that the Fed was considering tapering in Congressional testimony on 21 May 2013. Inflation breakevens, which had been falling into the announcement, declined further before recovering – chart 2.

Chart 2

Bernanke’s signal was a catalyst for real yields – which had reached negative levels similar to recently – to return to positive territory. The yield surge triggered a short-lived “risk-off” move in markets, focused on emerging markets and credit (the “taper tantrum”).

The market response spooked the Fed, causing the taper decision to be delayed until December 2013. When tapering finally started in January 2014, nominal and real yields embarked on a sustained decline. Inflation breakevens moved sideways but also fell later in 2014.

Cyclical sectors of equity markets outperformed defensive sectors between Bernanke’s May announcement and the start of tapering in January.

The view here, though, is that investors should be cautious about drawing parallels between 2013-14 and now.

The economic backdrop is a key difference. The global manufacturing PMI new orders index was about to embark on a significant rise as Bernanke gave his taper signal in May 2013 – chart 3. So it is difficult to disentangle the taper effect on yields from the usual correlation with cyclical momentum.

Chart 3

Economic momentum is slowing currently, with money trends suggesting a further PMI decline into early 2022.

This suggests that 1) the yield increase won't mirror 2013 because the taper announcement effect is offset by a weakening cyclical backdrop, and 2) any rise in real yields could be dangerous for cyclical assets because – in contrast to 2013 – a higher discount rate is unlikely to be balanced by positive economic / earnings news.

The global industrial slowdown signalled by a fall in manufacturing PMI new orders over June-August is now being reflected in a loss of earnings momentum.

The MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI) weekly revisions ratio, seasonally adjusted, fell below zero last week to its lowest level for more than a year – see chart 1.

Chart 1

With global real narrow money trends suggesting a further decline in manufacturing PMI new orders through early 2022, the revisions ratio is likely to remain in negative territory for the foreseeable future.

A falling PMI / weakening earnings momentum is typically associated with underperformance of non-tech cyclical equity market sectors (i.e. materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, financials and real estate) versus defensive sectors (consumer staples, health care, utilities and energy). The MSCI ACWI non-tech cyclical / defensive sector price relative has moved down in recent days, though remains above an August low – chart 2.

Chart 2

The latest decline, of course, reflects macro risk aversion due to the Evergrande crisis. The MSCI Emerging Markets non-tech cyclical / defensive sector price relative has crashed to a new low, with more modest weakness in the corresponding MSCI World (i.e. developed markets) relative – chart 3.

Chart 3

As the chart shows, the EM relative led moves down into lows in 2011-12, 2016 and 2018 (all associated with stockbuilding cycle downswings). The current wide divergence raises the possibility of a breakdown of the MSCI World relative; alternatively, the EM relative may have greater recovery potential.

Street research is discussing whether a looming Evergrande default represents a Minsky / Lehman moment (i.e. a tipping point into a financial crisis) or a Volcker moment (i.e. a policy decision to punish inflationary / speculative excess despite harsh macroeconomic consequences). The consensus is neither and that the authorities will be able and willing to contain the fallout.

The key issue, from a monetarist perspective, is whether tighter financial conditions due to the crisis persist and invalidate the previous central case scenario of a recovery in monetary trends in response to recent and prospective policy easing. Six-month growth rates of the private sector money measures calculated here fell back in August but remain above May lows – chart 4.

Chart 4

A useful indicator for assessing the potential monetary fallout is the corporate financing index from the Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business survey of private sector firms, a gauge of ease of access to credit. The index loosely correlates with money growth and has moved sideways (after seasonal adjustment) in recent months – chart 5. A sharp fall in the upcoming September survey would be a clear warning signal.

Chart 5

An FT article lists “Five big questions facing the Bank of England over rising inflation”. The most important one is missing: will broad money growth return to its pre-covid pace?

The current inflation increase, from a “monetarist” perspective, is directly linked to a surge in the broad money stock starting in spring 2020. Annual growth of non-financial M4 – the preferred aggregate here, comprising money holdings of households and private non-financial corporations (PNFCs) – rose from 3.9% in February 2020 to a peak of 16.1% a year later.

The monetarist rule of thumb is that money growth leads inflation with a long and variable lag averaging about two years. This is supported by research on UK post-war data previously reported here – turning points in broad money growth preceded turning points in core inflation by 27 months on average.

The lead time is variable partly because of the influence of exchange rate variations. For example, the disinflationary impact of UK monetary weakness after the GFC was delayed by upward pressure on import prices due to sterling depreciation.

The exchange rate has been relatively stable recently but the rise in inflation has been magnified by pandemic effects, which may mean that a peak occurs earlier than suggested by the February 2021 high in money growth and the average 27 month lag. The working assumption here is that core inflation will peak during H1 2022.

CPI inflation, however, is likely to overshoot the current Bank of England forecast throughout 2022 – chart 1 shows illustrative projections for headline and core rates.

Chart 1

The past mistakes of monetary policy are baked in. The MPC should focus on current monetary trends in assessing how to respond to its current / prospective inflation headache.

Annual broad money growth has fallen steadily from the February peak but, at 9.0% in July, remains well above its 4.2% average over 2010-19, a period during which CPI inflation averaged 2.2%. So monetary trends have yet to support the MPC’s assertion that the inflation overshoot is “transitory”.

The pace of increase, however, slowed to 4.4% at an annualised rate in the three months to July – chart 2. Household M4 rose by 5.8%, with PNFC holdings little changed. In terms of the credit counterparts, bank lending to households and PNFCs grew modestly (4.1%) while a continued QE boost was offset by negative external flows, suggesting balance of payments weakness.

Chart 2

With QE scheduled to finish at end-2021 (if not before), and a temporary boost to mortgage lending from the stamp duty holiday over, money growth could be gravitating back to its pre-covid pace.

An early interest rate rise, on the view here, is advisable to reinforce the recent monetary slowdown and push back against firming inflation expectations. It is premature, however, to argue that a sustained and significant increase in rates will be needed to return inflation to target beyond 2022 – further monetary evidence is required.

It would be unfortunate if, having fuelled the current inflation rise by questionable policy easing, the MPC were now to raise expectations of multiple rate hikes at a time when monetary growth could be returning to a target-consistent level.

Partial data indicate that global six-month real narrow money growth was little changed in August, following July’s fall to a 22-month low. Allowing for the usual lead, the suggestion is that the global economy will continue to lose momentum into early 2022, with no reacceleration before late Q1 at the earliest.

Global PMI results for August were consistent with the slowdown forecast, with the manufacturing new orders index falling for a third month – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The US ISM manufacturing new orders index unexpectedly rose in August but this appears to have been driven by a rise in inventories: the new orders / inventories differential, which often leads, fell to its lowest since January – chart 2.

Chart 2

The US, China, Japan, Brazil and India have released monetary information for August, together accounting for 70% of the G7 plus E7 aggregate calculated here*. CPI data are available for all countries bar the UK and Canada.

The stability of six-month real narrow money growth in August conceals a further slowdown in nominal money expansion offset by a small decline in CPI momentum – chart 3.

Chart 3

Previous posts discussed the possibility that real money growth would rebound during H2 2021, warranting optimism about economic prospects for 2022 and supporting another leg of the “reflation trade”. The monetary data have yet to validate this scenario.

The real money growth rebound scenario depended importantly on a pick-up in China in response to recent and prospective policy easing. Chinese six-month real narrow money growth does appear to have risen slightly in August** but there were offsetting declines in the US, Japan and Brazil – chart 4.

Chart 4

*The US number is estimated from weekly data on currency in circulation and commercial bank deposits.
**The household demand deposit component is estimated pending release of full data.