The MPC’s forecast in November was that annual CPI inflation would average 3.5% in Q2 2024 (November 2023 Monetary Policy Report (MPR), modal forecast assuming unchanged 5.25% rates). April’s drop to 2.3%, therefore, might be considered cause for celebration.

The negative market response reflected stronger-than-expected services price inflation, with the Bank of England’s “supercore” index rising by an annual 5.7%, a disappointingly small drop from 5.8% in March. This measure strips out “volatile and idiosyncratic” components, namely rents, package holidays, education and air fares.

The MPC has encouraged a focus on services inflation, citing it as one of three key gauges of “domestic inflationary persistence”, along with labour market tightness and wage growth. This prioritisation, however, is questionable, as there is no evidence that supercore leads other inflation components, whereas those components appear to contain leading information for supercore.

Chart 1 shows annual rates of change of three CPI sub-indices: supercore services (34% weight); other components of the core CPI index, i.e. core goods and non-supercore services (43%); and energy, food, alcohol and tobacco (22%).

Chart 1

Correlation analysis of this history suggests that supercore follows the other two series: correlation coefficients are maximised by applying a five-month lag on the other core components measure and a four-month lag on energy / food inflation.

Granger-causality tests show that inflation rates of the other core components sub-index and energy / food are individually significant for forecasting supercore. By contrast, supercore terms are insignificant in forecasting equations for the other two sub-indices*.

These results admittedly are strongly influenced by post-2019 data: supercore lagged the inflation upswing and peaked later than the other components.

A notable finding is that supercore has been more sensitive to changes in energy / food prices than the rest of the core index, conflicting with the notion that it is a purer gauge of domestic inflationary pressure. This is partly explained by the one-third weight of catering services in the supercore basket: the associated price index is strongly correlated with food prices.

A forecasting equation for supercore including both other sub-indices predicts a fall in annual inflation to 4.7% in July.

The latest MPR claims that monetary trends are of limited use for inflation forecasting over policy-relevant horizons. Lagged terms in broad money growth, however, are significant when added to the above forecasting equation. The July prediction is lowered to 4.5% with this addition.

A fall in annual supercore inflation to 4.7% in July would imply a dramatic slowdown in the three-month annualised rate of change (own seasonal adjustment), from over 6% in April to below 3%.

A “monetarist” view is that aggregate inflation trends reflect prior monetary conditions, with the distribution among components determined by relative demand / supply considerations. From this perspective, supercore strength is partly the counterpart of weakness in the other sub-indices. Headline CPI momentum continues to track the profile of broad money growth two years ago, a relationship suggesting a further easing of aggregate inflationary pressure into H1 2025 – chart 2.

Chart 2

*The regressions are based on 12-month rates of change and include lags 3, 6, 9 and 12 of the dependent and independent variables.

USD sales by monetary authorities in Japan, China and other Far East economies have probably topped $100 billion since April, exceeding intervention around the October 2022 dollar peak.

Market estimates are that JPY purchases / USD sales by the Bank of Japan on behalf of the Ministry of Finance on 29 April and 1 May totalled about ¥9 trillion / $ 57 billion. Official numbers covering the period from 26 April will be released next week.

Previous record monthly JPY purchases of ¥6.35 trn in October 2022 were associated with a USDJPY decline of 11.5% from October through January 2023 (month average data) – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Chinese intervention is best measured by the sum of net foreign exchange settlement by banks and the change in their net forward position, since currency support operations are often conducted via state-owned financial institutions rather than by the PBoC using official reserves (h/t Brad Setser).

This series suggests USD sales of $53 billion in April, the largest since December 2016. Increased pressure for currency support had been signalled by a blow-out in the forward discount on the offshore RMB – chart 2.

Chart 2

The Bank of Korea may have sold about $5 billion in April, judging from the change in value of reserves. With other Far East authorities also intervening, total USD sales may have exceeded $115 billion.

Intervention is more likely to be effective when supported by shifts in “fundamentals”.

The Bank of Japan’s real effective rate index, based on consumer prices, is at its lowest level since the late 1960s – chart 3*.

Chart 3

The USDJPY exchange rate has been tracking the 10-year US / Japan government yield spread but there was a negative divergence at the most recent dollar high – chart 4.

Chart 4

Major USDJPY turning points historically were usually preceded by a reversal in the US / Japan relative trade position, which peaked around a year ago – chart 5.

Chart 5

Trade deficits have narrowed in both countries but Japan’s improvement has been sharper, reflecting greater sensitivity to lower energy costs.

US futures data show that speculators (i.e. non-commercials) have been (correctly) long the dollar since March 2021, i.e. for three years and two months. The record unbroken long position occurred between 2012 and 2016, lasting three years and three months before a major reversal – chart 6.

Chart 6

The Fed’s real dollar index against advanced foreign economies peaked in October 2022 at a 29% deviation from its long-run average, within the range at secular tops in August 1969, March 1985 and February 2002 – chart 7**. Those peaks occurred six to seven years before lows in the 18-year (average length) housing cycle. The dollar trended lower into and beyond those cycle troughs. Assuming a normal cycle length, another such low is scheduled for the late 2020s.

Chart 7

*The BoJ index starts in 1970; earlier numbers were estimated using data on the nominal effective rate and Japanese / G7 consumer prices.

**The Fed index starts in 1973; earlier numbers were estimated using data on the nominal effective rate and US / G7 consumer prices.

“Gangbusters” UK GDP growth of 0.6% in Q1 may partly reflect inadequate adjustments for the leap year and early timing of Easter. In any case, the bigger story in recent national accounts data is nominal deceleration.

Nominal GDP rose at an annualised rate of 2.1% in Q4 and Q1 combined, down from 6.3% in the prior two quarters. With output momentum recovering slightly, the slowdown reflected a sharp fall in the rate of increase of the GDP deflator, from 6.6% annualised to 1.5% – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The drop in two-quarter nominal GDP momentum was signalled roughly a year ahead by falls in six-month broad and narrow money momentum into negative territory – chart 2. Money momentum has recovered since Q3 2023 but on both measures remains weaker than during the 2010s, when the GDP deflator rose at an average 1.8% pace.

Chart 2

As an aside, the latest Monetary Policy Report contains a lengthy discussion of monetary developments and their relevance for policy. The strategy, as usual, is to damn with faint praise. While “broad money growth and inflation appear to have moved together over long cycles … it is harder to take an unambiguous signal about inflationary pressures from growth in the aggregate money data in isolation over shorter, policy-relevant, horizons.”

Really? Study chart 2. A directional leading relationship in rates of change is obvious. Except around the initial Covid lockdown, there are no examples of money momentum giving a seriously misleading message about future nominal GDP developments. As well as signalling the 2021-22 inflation surge, money trends warned of economic weakness / falling price pressures in 2008-09 and 2011-12, while contradicting recession forecasts following the Brexit referendum result. “Monetarists” were on the right side of the policy debate on all these occasions.

The income analysis of GDP allows movements in the GDP deflator to be attributed to changes in labour costs and broadly defined profits per unit of output. How has the recent sharp slowdown been achieved given supposedly sticky wage pressures?

According to the national accounts numbers, employee compensation per unit of output rose at an annualised rate of 1.8% in Q4 / Q1, down from 6.9% in the prior two quarters – chart 3. This slowdown is consistent with official earnings data and reflects a combination of 1) a moderation in regular earnings momentum, 2) a fall in bonus payments and 3) a pick-up in productivity (i.e. output per worker) as employment fell.

Chart 3

Profits and other “entrepreneurial” income per unit of output, meanwhile rose by only 1.1% annualised in the latest two quarters, versus 6.3% in Q2 / Q3 2023.

Domestic cost developments, therefore, are compatible with the inflation target while money growth, although recovering, remains too low. The “monetarist” view is that the MPC is behind the curve – again.

A post in February argued that US Treasury plans to reduce reliance on bills to fund the deficit implied weaker monetary expansion from Q2, with possible negative implications for markets and economic prospects. This scenario remains on track.

The Treasury last week confirmed a reduction in the stock of Treasury bills in Q2 while signalling small-scale issuance in Q3.

Deficit financing via bills rather than coupon debt tends to boost the broad money stock because bills are mostly bought by money-creating institutions, i.e. banks and money funds. Their purchases are usually associated with expansion of their balance sheets, with a corresponding increase in monetary liabilities.

Broad money also tends to rise when the Treasury finances the deficit by running down its cash balance at the Fed.

Both effects were in play in 2023 / early 2024, resulting in a large monetary boost from Treasury operations that more than offset the Fed’s QT – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The latest Treasury estimates, however, imply a small negative impact in Q2 / Q3 combined. The earlier post argued that the Fed would need to halt QT to offset this shift. Last week’s taper announcement was insufficient, implying that the combined Treasury / Fed influence is likely to turn significantly contractionary – chart 2.

Chart 2

Will a revival in bank lending neutralise the Treasury / Fed drag? The Fed’s April senior loan officer survey was less negative but demand and supply balances remain soft by historical standards, arguing against a strong pick-up – chart 3.

Chart 3

April monetary statistics will be released in late May but weekly numbers on currency, commercial bank deposits and money funds are consistent with emerging weakness  – chart 4.

Chart 4

The Fed’s preferred core price measure – the PCE price index excluding food and energy – rose by an average 0.36% per month, equivalent to 4.4% annualised, over January-March.

The FOMC median projection in March was for annual core inflation to fall to 2.6% in Q4 2024. This would require the monthly index rise to step down to an average 0.17% over the remainder of the year – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The judgement here is that such a slowdown is achievable and could be exceeded, based on the following considerations.

First, such performance was bettered in H2 2023, when the monthly rise averaged 0.155%, or 1.9% annualised, i.e. the requirement is within the range of recent experience.

Secondly, the monetarist rule of thumb of a two-year lead from money to prices suggests a strong disinflationary impulse during H2 2024. From this perspective, any current “stickiness” may reflect the after-effects of a second pick-up in six-month broad money momentum in 2021, following the initial surge into mid-2020– see chart 2.

Chart 2

Momentum returned to a target-consistent 4-5% annualised in April 2022, subsequently turning negative and recovering only from March 2023, with the latest reading still sub-5%. Allowing for the usual lag, the suggestion is that six-month price momentum will move below 2% in H2 2024, remaining weak through next year.

A third potential favourable influence is a speeding-up of the transmission of recent slower growth of timely measures of market rents to the PCE housing component. Six-month momentum of the latter was still up at 5.6% annualised in March but weakness in the BLS new tenants rent index through 2023 is consistent with a return to the pre-pandemic (i.e. 2015-19) average of 3.4% or lower – chart 3. With a weight of 17.5%, such a decline would subtract 3 bp from the monthly core PCE change.

Chart 3