Japanese money trends remain ominously weak, suggesting poor economic / market prospects and a return of inflation to unacceptably low levels.

Annual growth rates of broad money M3 and narrow money M1 fell to 0.7% and 1.5% respectively in October, well below 2010-19 averages of 2.6% / 5.1% and the lowest since the GFC – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Record f/x intervention resulted in monetary contraction in Q2 but a subsequent recovery has been minor, partly reflecting BoJ policy tightening. M3 and M1 grew at annualised rates of 0.5% and 0.1% in the three months to October – chart 2.

Chart 2

Japanese economic prospects represent another test of “monetarist” vs. consensus forecasting approaches. The BoJ / consensus view is that above-potential economic growth, a tight labour market and a gradual rise in adaptive inflationary expectations will result in annual CPI inflation – on both the targeted ex. fresh food measure and the BoJ’s core index also excluding energy – remaining close to the 2% target in FY 2025 and FY 2026. The BoJ views risks as skewed to the upside, warranting a tightening bias.

The “monetarist” view, by contrast, is that 2022-23 inflation resulted from a temporary spike in money growth in 2020, with the effects extended by a big fall in the yen. With money growth well below the 2010-19 average, CPI inflation is heading back to, or beneath, its corresponding average of 0.5%, unless the exchange rate suffers a further collapse.

Headline CPI numbers have been affected by changes in energy and travel subsidies but six-month core momentum (on the standard international definition excluding all food as well as energy) has fallen back below 2% annualised, consistent directionally with the earlier slowdown in money growth – chart 3. The level of core momentum still incorporates the effects of yen weakness.

Chart 3

Chart 4 shows the contributions of the “credit counterparts” to annual M3 growth, with data available through September. Comparing with growth a year earlier, the largest drag has been a shift in domestic credit to government from expansion to slight contraction, reflecting the impact of f/x sales (which reduce government borrowing needs) and the BoJ moving from QE to QT.

Chart 4

A slowdown in domestic credit to other sectors has also exerted a negative influence. The measure shown is significantly broader than the BoJ’s series for loans and discounts by commercial banks but growth in the latter has also moderated recently, while the latest senior loan officer survey reported weaker expectations for credit demand – chart 5.

Chart 5

Is there still an overhang of money from the 2020 surge sufficient to sustain nominal economic expansion despite current low M3 growth? This can be answered using the “quantity theory of wealth” – the idea that asset prices and incomes adjust such that a geometric average of wealth and nominal GDP rises in line with broad money over the medium term.

Chart 6 shows that, using Q4 2018 as a base, a nominal GDP undershoot relative to broad money (i.e. a fall in conventionally defined velocity) has been offset by a wealth overshoot, resulting in the average moving slightly ahead of the level implied by the money stock in Q2 2024.

Chart 6

The suggestion is that an “excess” money reserve has been exhausted and, unless asset prices fall, current low money growth will be reflected in nominal economic weakness.

Global “excess” liquidity has surged to a level breached only twice over the last half-century, implying a favourable backdrop for risk assets, according to a Bloomberg article. The assessment here, by contrast, is that excess money conditions are neutral / negative.

Actual growth of the money stock can exceed or fall short of the rate of increase of money demand for economic and portfolio purposes. Deviations are reflected partly in changes in demand for financial / real assets and associated price movements.

The rate of increase of (real) money demand is unobservable. Two proxies are 1) the current rate of (real) economic expansion and 2) a long-term average of real money growth, this being assumed to capture the trend rise in money demand.

Accordingly, the approach followed here historically has relied on two flow indicators of excess or deficient money:

• The gap between real narrow money and industrial output momentum (six-month rates of change preferred).

• The deviation of real narrow money momentum from a long-term average (12-month rate of change preferred).

Chart 1 shows a cumulative return index of global equities relative to US dollar cash together with the two indicators. The indicators have been lagged to allow for reporting delays, i.e. the readings for a particular month would have been known at the time (ignoring revisions). Shaded areas denote double-positive readings. Equities outperformed cash significantly on average during these periods (i.e. averaging performance in the month following each monthly signal). They underperformed on average under mixed or double-negative readings.

Chart 1

The first indicator is hovering around zero while the second remains negative.

The excess liquidity indicator referred to in the Bloomberg article is described as measuring how much real money growth outperforms economic growth, suggesting that it should resemble the first indicator above. Like here, narrow (M1) money is used in the calculation. Coverage, however, is restricted to the G10 developed markets and growth rates may be measured over 12 rather than six months.

Chart 2 shows a G7 version of the real narrow money / industrial output momentum gap calculated on a 12-month basis, which should be a close substitute for a G10 measure. This indicator turned positive in July but is far from historical highs.

Chart 2

What explains the much more bullish Bloomberg reading? The guess here is that the Bloomberg indicator is a deviation of the real money / economic growth gap from some measure of trend, rather than its absolute level. The current gap, for example, is significantly higher than a 24-month moving average, also shown in chart 2.

In this case, the Bloomberg indicator would be better described as a measure of excess money acceleration rather than growth. The current high reading would reflect a recovery in excess money momentum from deep negative to slightly positive.

Conceptually, it is unclear why the demand for assets should be related to the second derivative of excess money rather than its growth or level. The Bloomberg indicator correctly signalled the strength of equity markets this year, though not in 2023. Backtesting indicates that the sign of an acceleration measure would have underperformed that of the level of excess money growth in signalling whether equity markets returns were above or below cash rates historically.

Why did the measures shown in chart 1 “miss” the strength of equity markets in 2023-24?

Excess or deficient money need not affect all markets similarly. Treasuries, commercial property and commodities may have borne the brunt of a money flow shortfall.

Preference for equities has been boosted by the AI boom and associated strength in a small number of large cap stocks. The MSCI World equal-weighted index has underperformed US dollar cash since the excess money indicators in chart 1 turned negative around end-2021.

The key reason for the disconnect with market performance, however, is that the flow measures were, on this occasion, an insufficient guide to the excess money backdrop, failing to take account of a still-large stock overhang left over from the 2020-21 money growth surge.

The “quantity theory of wealth”, explained in posts in 2020, is a suggested modification of the traditional quantity theory recognising that (broad) money demand depends on wealth as well as income and proposing equal elasticities. Nominal income is replaced on the right-hand side of the equation of exchange MV = PY by a geometric mean of income and wealth.

Chart 3 applies the “theory” to US data since end-2014.

Chart 3

The combined income / wealth variable closely tracked moderate growth of broad money over 2015-19. Wealth rose faster than income, so traditionally-defined velocity fell. The velocity of the combined income / wealth measure was stable.

The policy response to the covid shock resulted in possibly unprecedented monetary disequilibrium. Asset prices responded swiftly to the excess, causing wealth to overshoot broad money in 2021. Excess money flow indicators turned negative around end-2021 and wealth corrected sharply in 2022.

The combined income / wealth measure was still well below the level implied by broad money even before this correction. Deployment of the excess stock fuelled a second surge in wealth from late 2022 while sustaining economic growth despite monetary policy tightening.

Asset price gains, goods / services inflation and real economic expansion resulted in the income / wealth measure finally converging with broad money at end-Q2, with an estimated small overshoot at end-Q3. So the velocity of the combined measure has returned to its end-2019 level.

Stock as well as flow considerations, therefore, suggest that the excess money backdrop is now neutral at best.

Global (i.e. G7 plus E7) six-month real narrow money momentum is estimated to have edged lower in September, based on monetary data covering 88% of the aggregate. Momentum has been moving sideways since the spring at a weak level by historical standards, suggesting that the global economy will expand at a below-trend pace through mid-2025 – see chart 1. 

Chart 1

Note that the global narrow money measure incorporates an adjustment for a recent negative distortion to Chinese data from regulatory changes, i.e. momentum would be weaker than shown without this correction. 

A low in real money momentum in September 2023 was expected here to be reflected in a decline in global industrial momentum – as proxied by the manufacturing PMI new orders index – into a low in late 2024. October flash results could be consistent with a bottoming out: PMIs fell in Japan and the UK but recovered slightly in the US and Eurozone – chart 2. 

Chart 2

With money trends remaining weak, a manufacturing recovery into H1 2025 was expected to be limited and offset by a loss of momentum in services. Services business activity indices in the Eurozone and UK fell to 20- and 23-month lows respectively in October, according to flash results, with a sharper decline in Japan. US activity and new business indices, however, were strong, although the employment component remained sub-50. 

Chart 3

US relative strength is also evidenced by October earnings revisions ratios, with US net upgrades contrasting with weakness in Japan and Europe, particularly the UK – chart 4. 

Chart 4

US economic outperformance is consistent with a recent wide gap between US and European / Japanese six-month real narrow money momentum. The expectation here was for a US pull-back in September due to an unfavourable base effect but this proved minor, with narrow money rising solidly again on the month – chart 5. 

Chart 5

Eurozone / UK real narrow money momentum continues to recover but disappointingly slowly, suggesting a more urgent need for policy easing. A slump in Japan, initially due to f/x intervention but sustained by BoJ policy tightening, signals likely further negative economic news. 

US narrow money acceleration started long before the September rate cut and hasn’t been mirrored by broader aggregates. One interpretation is that households / firms are accumulating “transactions” money in anticipation of increasing spending after the elections. Chart 6 suggests a tendency for narrow money momentum to pick up into presidential elections and reverse thereafter, with occasional notable exceptions (1984, 2000). 

Chart 6

The MPC’s slowness to cut rates risks aggravating a recent loss of economic momentum and prolonging an inflation undershoot.

The expected 25 bp cut in November would be insufficient to catch up with reductions to date in the Eurozone, Sweden, Switzerland and Canada – see chart 1.

Chart 1

UK annual headline consumer price inflation is as low or lower than in all these jurisdictions except Switzerland – chart 2.

Chart 2

The MPC's focus on the "core services" third of the inflation basket is misplaced. Monetary conditions determine aggregate inflation, with the component breakdown partly shaped by “exogenous” factors. A fall in energy prices and slowdown in food costs have suppressed headline inflation while allowing consumers to spend more on other items, delaying price deceleration in these areas.

This suggested that services disinflation would speed up as commodity prices stabilised or recovered, a development that appears to be playing out – chart 3.

Chart 3

Six-month consumer price momentum continues to mirror the profile of broad money growth two years earlier, a relationship suggesting a further decline and extended undershoot of the 2% target. A recovery in six-month broad money momentum has stalled below the 4.5% pa level historically consistent with 2% inflation – chart 4.

Chart 4

UK six-month real narrow money momentum is negative and similar to levels in the Eurozone, Sweden and Switzerland, suggesting equally poor economic prospects – chart 5.

Chart 5

The double dip mooted in an earlier post could be under way. Recent signs of a loss of momentum include a faster rate of decline of job vacancies and an increase in small firm earnings downgrades – chart 6.

Chart 6

The previous government’s fiscal plans implied significant tightening in 2024 and 2025, according to the OBR – chart 7. Changes to the fiscal rules to be announced by Chancellor Reeves will allow for additional medium-term borrowing but are unlikely to alleviate near-term restriction.

Chart 7

It might be expected that the MPC would be especially sensitive to downside risks, following its mistake of responding too late in the opposite scenario in 2021-22 when inflation was starting to rip. Could confirmation of economic weakness and a restrictive Budget yet put a warranted 50 bp on the table for November?

A post last month suggested that Chinese money growth was bottoming, based on year-to-date policy easing and the space for additional stimulus opened up by a stabilisation of the currency. September money numbers and recent policy announcements bolster this assessment but the scale of monetary acceleration is uncertain.

As previously discussed, narrow money measures have been distorted by regulatory changes in April that reduced the attractiveness of demand deposits, arguing for giving greater weight to broader aggregates. Six-month growth of the preferred broad measure here – M2 excluding deposits of non-bank financial institutions – bottomed in June, edging up further in September. Broad money has led nominal GDP by around six months at momentum turning points historically, suggesting that two-quarter nominal GDP expansion will bottom by year-end – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Narrative about the insufficiency of the latest initiatives may underestimate policy stimulus already in the pipeline. Government net securities issuance reached CNY10.8 trillion or 8.3% of GDP in the 12 months to September, the highest proportion since 2017 and up by 2.6 pp from the prior 12 months. A further increase is likely. The banking system buys the bulk of securities so increased issuance usually boosts broad money growth (unless funds are used to repay other bank lending or increase system capital) – chart 2*.

Chart 2

Stimulus packages in 2008-09 and 2015-16 succeeded in reflating nominal GDP growth; smaller-scale initiatives in 2012-13 and 2019-20 resulted in stabilisation but little increase – chart 3. The extent of a recovery in money growth will signal which scenario is more likely. Markets appear to be discounting the latter: the yield curve (10s-2s) has steepened but less than in 2009 and 2015, while the rally in MSCI China still leaves it on a significant forward P / E discount to the rest of EM – chart 4.

Chart 3

Chart 4

*Increased issuance is reflected initially in a rise in fiscal deposits, excluded from monetary aggregates. The monetary impact occurs when funds are deployed. A rise in fiscal deposits reduced the contribution of banking system net lending to government to annual M2 growth by 0.3 pp in September.

Monetary prospects and cycle considerations suggest global economic strength in H2 2025 / 2026 but a “hard landing” – or at least a scare of one – may be necessary first.

Commentary here at mid-year proposed the following baseline scenario:

• A “double dip” in global industrial momentum in H2 2024 with limited recovery in early 2025, reflecting the profile of real narrow money momentum with a roughly one-year lag.

• Pass-through of industrial weakness to the services sector and – crucially – employment, the latter contrasting with experience during the first “dip” in 2022 when labour markets were in excess demand and unaffected.

• A further decline in consumer price inflation rates to below target in H1 2025, echoing a fall in broad money growth to very low levels in H1 2023, assuming a typical two-year lag.

• A rapid response of monetary policy-makers to downside labour market and inflation surprises, resulting in official rates falling by more by spring 2025 than markets expected in mid-2024.

• A consequent strong pick-up in real narrow money momentum by spring 2025, laying the foundation for an economic boom starting in late 2025, consistent with the cyclical framework suggesting joint strength in the stockbuilding, business investment and housing cycles.

The near-term hard – or hard-ish – landing in this scenario is necessary to elicit policy easing sufficient to drive the later boom. Without it, the global economy could remain stuck in a slow-growth equilibrium into 2026, with policy rates kept above a neutral level despite low inflation.

Incoming news has been consistent with several elements of the baseline scenario but others require confirmation:

• The global manufacturing PMI new orders index fell to a 21-month low in September. Global six-month real narrow money momentum bottomed in September 2023, signalling a likely PMI trough by end-2024 – see chart 1.

Chart 1

• Real narrow money momentum has been moving sideways since the spring at a low level by historical standards, consistent with industrial momentum remaining weak in early 2025.

• Manufacturing weakness appears to be transferring to services. The global services PMI new business index remained at an expansion-consistent level in September but output expectations fell sharply to a 23-month low – chart 2.

Chart 2

• Employment weakness has yet to crystallise. The global composite PMI employment index is below a low reached during the first dip in 2022 but not yet in contraction territory (50.0 in September). The US economy has continued to add jobs, although payrolls numbers are probably still overstating growth and average weekly hours have fallen.

• Inflation news has been favourable. Six-month headline / core consumer price momentum in the US and Eurozone has moved lower since mid-2024, while global PMI output price indices for consumer goods and services have stabilised close to their 2015-19 averages, when G7 annual core CPI inflation averaged 1.6% – chart 3.

Chart 3

• Monetary authorities have in most cases shifted dovishly since mid-year. A major Chinese policy pivot at quarter-end could lead to a strong rebound in narrow money growth, supporting the expectation of global acceleration.

To summarise, the baseline scenario is still on track but requires confirmation from early further deterioration in labour market news as well as continued inflation progress.

The stabilisation of global six-month real narrow money momentum at a weak level conceals significant geographical dispersion. A strong pick-up in the US has been offset by falls in China and Japan, while a slow recovery in the Eurozone has caught up with a stalling UK – chart 4.

Chart 4

The rise in US momentum is puzzling and challenges the expected scenario of economic weakness and labour market deterioration into H1 2025. A near-term stall or reversal would reduce this tension and is plausible, with large monthly rises in March / April about to drop out of the six-month comparison.

Momentum remains negative across Europe but – except in the UK – has continued to recover, with a further acceleration expected as a pattern of rate cuts at successive policy meetings is established. UK-Eurozone monetary convergence is at odds with market themes of UK relative economic resilience and inflation stickiness, and incoming data could force the MPC to shift dovishly soon.

Interpretation of Chinese monetary trends has been clouded recent regulatory changes that have reduced the attractiveness of demand deposits, resulting in a switch into time deposits and money substitutes. The narrow money measure shown in chart 4 incorporates an adjustment but the “true” picture could be stronger or weaker. Previous large stimulus packages have fed rapidly through to monetary acceleration but – even if this occurs – economic momentum is likely to remain weak through Q2 2025, at least.

The cyclical framework used here judges current global economic weakness to reflect mid-cycle corrections in stockbuilding and business investment upswings, rather than new downswings in either cycle. The stockbuilding cycle (3-5 years) bottomed in Q1 2023 but an initial recovery due to an ending of destocking has fizzled as final demand has remained weak. The assumption is that policy easing will generate a second leg up in 2025, with a cycle peak possibly delayed until 2026.

The primary trend in the business investment cycle (7-11 years, last low 2020) is also still up, with the current correction probably attributable to a combination of restrictive interest rates, a profits slowdown and heightened uncertainty. Corporate financial balances (retained earnings minus capex) are in surplus in the US, Japan and Eurozone and a recovery in global economic momentum in 2025 could generate a strong “accelerator” effect on investment as animal spirits revive.

A key assumption is that the long-term housing cycle (average 18 years), which bottomed in 2009, will enjoy a final burst of strength in response to lower rates before peaking, possibly in 2026. One reason for believing that the upswing is incomplete is that peaks were historically associated with mortgage lending booms: annual growth of US residential mortgages reached double-digits before downswings into lows in 1957, 1975, 1991 and 2009. The high so far in the current cycle has been 9% (in 2022), with lower numbers in the Eurozone and UK.

The mid-year commentary suggested that defensive equity market sectors would outperform as a H2 double dip unfolded. They did through early September but cyclical sectors rebounded on hopes of rapid Fed easing and large-scale Chinese stimulus. Even if forthcoming, the economic effects will be delayed and may already be discounted in relative valuations – chart 5.

Chart 5

Markets have historically correlated with the stockbuilding cycle, so one approach to assessing investment potential is to compare returns so far in the current cycle with an average of prior upswings. As shown in table 1, US equities, cyclical sectors and gold have performed more strongly than the historical average in the 18 months since the cycle trough in Q1 2023, suggesting limited further upside and possible reversals, even assuming a late cycle peak.

Table 1 

International equities – particularly emerging markets – have, by contrast, underperformed relative to history in the current cycle, while commodity prices have been unusually weak. Though also likely to suffer in any near-term hard landing scare, these areas have catch-up potential in the baseline scenario of global economic acceleration through 2025 driven partly by the stockbuilding cycle upswing entering a second phase.