Monetary prospects and cycle considerations suggest global economic strength in H2 2025 / 2026 but a “hard landing” – or at least a scare of one – may be necessary first.

Commentary here at mid-year proposed the following baseline scenario:

• A “double dip” in global industrial momentum in H2 2024 with limited recovery in early 2025, reflecting the profile of real narrow money momentum with a roughly one-year lag.

• Pass-through of industrial weakness to the services sector and – crucially – employment, the latter contrasting with experience during the first “dip” in 2022 when labour markets were in excess demand and unaffected.

• A further decline in consumer price inflation rates to below target in H1 2025, echoing a fall in broad money growth to very low levels in H1 2023, assuming a typical two-year lag.

• A rapid response of monetary policy-makers to downside labour market and inflation surprises, resulting in official rates falling by more by spring 2025 than markets expected in mid-2024.

• A consequent strong pick-up in real narrow money momentum by spring 2025, laying the foundation for an economic boom starting in late 2025, consistent with the cyclical framework suggesting joint strength in the stockbuilding, business investment and housing cycles.

The near-term hard – or hard-ish – landing in this scenario is necessary to elicit policy easing sufficient to drive the later boom. Without it, the global economy could remain stuck in a slow-growth equilibrium into 2026, with policy rates kept above a neutral level despite low inflation.

Incoming news has been consistent with several elements of the baseline scenario but others require confirmation:

• The global manufacturing PMI new orders index fell to a 21-month low in September. Global six-month real narrow money momentum bottomed in September 2023, signalling a likely PMI trough by end-2024 – see chart 1.

Chart 1

• Real narrow money momentum has been moving sideways since the spring at a low level by historical standards, consistent with industrial momentum remaining weak in early 2025.

• Manufacturing weakness appears to be transferring to services. The global services PMI new business index remained at an expansion-consistent level in September but output expectations fell sharply to a 23-month low – chart 2.

Chart 2

• Employment weakness has yet to crystallise. The global composite PMI employment index is below a low reached during the first dip in 2022 but not yet in contraction territory (50.0 in September). The US economy has continued to add jobs, although payrolls numbers are probably still overstating growth and average weekly hours have fallen.

• Inflation news has been favourable. Six-month headline / core consumer price momentum in the US and Eurozone has moved lower since mid-2024, while global PMI output price indices for consumer goods and services have stabilised close to their 2015-19 averages, when G7 annual core CPI inflation averaged 1.6% – chart 3.

Chart 3

• Monetary authorities have in most cases shifted dovishly since mid-year. A major Chinese policy pivot at quarter-end could lead to a strong rebound in narrow money growth, supporting the expectation of global acceleration.

To summarise, the baseline scenario is still on track but requires confirmation from early further deterioration in labour market news as well as continued inflation progress.

The stabilisation of global six-month real narrow money momentum at a weak level conceals significant geographical dispersion. A strong pick-up in the US has been offset by falls in China and Japan, while a slow recovery in the Eurozone has caught up with a stalling UK – chart 4.

Chart 4

The rise in US momentum is puzzling and challenges the expected scenario of economic weakness and labour market deterioration into H1 2025. A near-term stall or reversal would reduce this tension and is plausible, with large monthly rises in March / April about to drop out of the six-month comparison.

Momentum remains negative across Europe but – except in the UK – has continued to recover, with a further acceleration expected as a pattern of rate cuts at successive policy meetings is established. UK-Eurozone monetary convergence is at odds with market themes of UK relative economic resilience and inflation stickiness, and incoming data could force the MPC to shift dovishly soon.

Interpretation of Chinese monetary trends has been clouded recent regulatory changes that have reduced the attractiveness of demand deposits, resulting in a switch into time deposits and money substitutes. The narrow money measure shown in chart 4 incorporates an adjustment but the “true” picture could be stronger or weaker. Previous large stimulus packages have fed rapidly through to monetary acceleration but – even if this occurs – economic momentum is likely to remain weak through Q2 2025, at least.

The cyclical framework used here judges current global economic weakness to reflect mid-cycle corrections in stockbuilding and business investment upswings, rather than new downswings in either cycle. The stockbuilding cycle (3-5 years) bottomed in Q1 2023 but an initial recovery due to an ending of destocking has fizzled as final demand has remained weak. The assumption is that policy easing will generate a second leg up in 2025, with a cycle peak possibly delayed until 2026.

The primary trend in the business investment cycle (7-11 years, last low 2020) is also still up, with the current correction probably attributable to a combination of restrictive interest rates, a profits slowdown and heightened uncertainty. Corporate financial balances (retained earnings minus capex) are in surplus in the US, Japan and Eurozone and a recovery in global economic momentum in 2025 could generate a strong “accelerator” effect on investment as animal spirits revive.

A key assumption is that the long-term housing cycle (average 18 years), which bottomed in 2009, will enjoy a final burst of strength in response to lower rates before peaking, possibly in 2026. One reason for believing that the upswing is incomplete is that peaks were historically associated with mortgage lending booms: annual growth of US residential mortgages reached double-digits before downswings into lows in 1957, 1975, 1991 and 2009. The high so far in the current cycle has been 9% (in 2022), with lower numbers in the Eurozone and UK.

The mid-year commentary suggested that defensive equity market sectors would outperform as a H2 double dip unfolded. They did through early September but cyclical sectors rebounded on hopes of rapid Fed easing and large-scale Chinese stimulus. Even if forthcoming, the economic effects will be delayed and may already be discounted in relative valuations – chart 5.

Chart 5

Markets have historically correlated with the stockbuilding cycle, so one approach to assessing investment potential is to compare returns so far in the current cycle with an average of prior upswings. As shown in table 1, US equities, cyclical sectors and gold have performed more strongly than the historical average in the 18 months since the cycle trough in Q1 2023, suggesting limited further upside and possible reversals, even assuming a late cycle peak.

Table 1 

International equities – particularly emerging markets – have, by contrast, underperformed relative to history in the current cycle, while commodity prices have been unusually weak. Though also likely to suffer in any near-term hard landing scare, these areas have catch-up potential in the baseline scenario of global economic acceleration through 2025 driven partly by the stockbuilding cycle upswing entering a second phase.

Monetary trends suggest that UK economic performance will converge down to a weak Eurozone.

A post in June argued that Eurozone monetary trends were too weak to support a sustained recovery. The composite PMI output index peaked in May and fell below 50 in September (flash reading of 48.9), confirming an ongoing “double dip”.

The UK economy has outperformed year-to-date: GDP grew by 1.2% between Q4 and Q2 versus a 0.5% rise in the Eurozone, while the composite PMI has moved sideways above 50 (September flash reading of 52.9).

This outperformance, however, follows relative weakness in H2 2023, when GDP contracted in the UK but eked out a small gain in the Eurozone. Q2 year-on-year GDP growth rates are similar, at 0.7% and 0.6% respectively.

This pattern – of UK underperformance in H2 2023 followed by a catch-up in 2024 – had been signalled by monetary trends. Six-month real narrow money momentum was weaker in the UK than the Eurozone in 2022 through Q2 2023 but UK momentum recovered faster last year and had opened up a lead by Q1 2024 – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The lead, however, has been narrowing since April and almost closed in August, partly reflecting a recent stalling of the UK recovery. With momentum still negative, the suggestion is that UK and Eurozone economic performance will be similarly weak through early 2025.

As well as supposed UK relative economic strength, the expectation that rates will be slower to fall in the UK than the Eurozone incorporates a belief that inflation will prove stickier. This is also at odds with monetary trends.

Inflation rates are tracking the profile of broad money momentum two years earlier, in line with a simplistic monetarist prediction. Annual broad money growth was lower in the UK than the Eurozone in 2022 and 2023, suggesting that an undershoot of UK annual CPI inflation versus the Eurozone over May-July will resume in 2025 – chart 2.

Chart 2

A UK double dip would be blamed partly on the confidence-sapping impact of the new government’s gloomy fiscal pronouncements. The MPC’s failure to deliver timely easing would carry much greater responsibility.

A pick-up in US narrow money momentum is a hopeful signal for 2025 but requires confirmation and does not preclude near-term economic deterioration.

The measure of narrow money tracked here (M1A, comprising currency in circulation and demand deposits) rose by 0.8% in August, pushing six-month annualised growth up to 10.5% – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The broad M2+ measure (which adds large time deposits at commercial banks and institutional money funds to the official M2 aggregate) also rose solidly in August, by 0.5%, but six-month growth remains subdued and within the recent range, at 3.5% annualised.

Six-month expansion of official M1 is weaker, at 2.1%. M1 is no longer a narrow money measure, following its redefinition in 2020 to include savings accounts.

Narrow money outperforms broad as a leading indicator of economic direction. The recent pick-up suggests that demand and activity will be gaining momentum by mid-2025. It does not, however, preclude – and may be consistent with – current economic deterioration.

Six-month narrow money momentum similarly recovered from negative to 10% annualised in September 2001 and September 2008. In both cases, the economy was within a recession that the NBER had yet to recognise.

Those narrow money rebounds may have partly reflected a rise in liquidity preference associated with an increase in saving, i.e. they may have been a signal of a reduction in current demand. They also, however, implied potential for future economic reacceleration when liquidity preference normalised and money balances were redeployed.

The 2001 / 2008 experiences were atypical: in earlier recessions, six-month narrow money growth rose strongly only at the end of – or after – the period of economic contraction.

A reasonable assessment, therefore, is that a pick-up in narrow money momentum is a neutral or negative signal for current economic momentum but positive for prospects six to 12 months ahead.

The current positive message is tempered by several considerations.

First, six-month momentum is likely to fall back in September / October because of negative base effects: narrow money rose by a whopping 3.1% (20.0% annualised) in March / April combined.

Secondly, the currency and demand deposit components of narrow money have been individually correlated with future activity historically but the recent pick-up has been solely due to the latter, with currency momentum unusually weak – chart 1.

Thirdly, the Fed funds target rate had been cut by 350 bp and 325 bp respectively by the time six-month narrow money momentum reached 10% annualised in 2001 and 2008. The Fed’s tardiness has increased the risk of a monetary relapse.

Chinese money / credit trends remain weak but could be at a turning point.

Six-month rates of change of broad money and total social financing have stabilised above June lows – see chart 1. (Broad money here refers to M2 excluding money holdings of financial institutions, which are volatile and less informative about economic prospects.)

Chart 1

Narrow money is contracting at a record pace but has been distorted by regulatory changes in April that have reduced the attractiveness of demand deposits, resulting in enterprises shifting into time deposits and money substitutes while repaying some short-term bank borrowing. (The “true M1” measure shown adds household demand deposits to the published M1 aggregate to align with international monetary convention.)

Chart 2 compares six-month rates of change of the raw narrow money series and two adjusted measures. The first assumes that the share of demand deposits in total bank deposits of non-financial enterprises would have remained at its March level in the absence of the regulatory changes. The second additionally adds the inflow to instant-access wealth management products (WMPs) since end-March (data sourced from CICC), on the assumption that this represents a transfer from demand deposits. Six-month momentum of the latter measure was similar in July to the series low reached at end-2014.

Chart 2

A key reason for expecting money / credit reacceleration is that the yen rally has relieved pressure on the RMB, easing monetary conditions directly and opening up space for further PBoC policy action. The balance of payments turnaround is confirmed by a swing in the banking system’s net f/x transactions, including forwards, from sales of $58 billion in July to purchases of $10 billion in August. This series captures covert intervention via state banks (h/t Brad Setser) and an August reversal had been suggested by a sharp narrowing of the forward discount on the offshore RMB, which has remained lower so far in September – chart 3.

Chart 3

Actual and expected monetary easing has been reflected in a further steepening of the yield curve, which has correlated with, and sometimes led, money momentum historically – chart 4.

Chart 4

An easing of Chinese monetary conditions coupled with the start of a Fed rate-cutting cycle could have a powerful monetary impact in Hong Kong, where six-month momentum of local-currency M1 recently returned to positive territory, having reached its weakest level since the Asian crisis in October 2022 – chart 5.

Chart 5

Monetary considerations argue that the ECB’s latest inflation forecast, like earlier projections, will be undershot.

Annual growth of broad money – as measured by non-financial M3 – returned to its pre-pandemic (i.e. 2015-19) average of 4.8% in October 2022. Allowing for a typical two-year lead, this suggested that annual CPI inflation would return to about 2% in late 2024 – see chart 1. The August reading was 2.1% (ECB seasonally-adjusted measure).

Chart 1

The ECB staff forecast in December 2022 was more pessimistic, projecting annual inflation of 3.3% in Q4 2024. The forecast for that quarter was still up at 2.9% in June 2023 after natural gas prices had collapsed.

Annual broad money growth continued to plunge in 2023, reaching a low just above zero in November, since recovering to a paltry 2.5%. Simplistic monetarism, therefore, suggests that inflation will move below target in 2025 and remain there into 2026 – chart 2.

Chart 2

The September 2024 ECB staff forecast, by contrast, shows inflation rising in Q4 and remaining above 2% until Q4 2025.

The monetarist relationship, taken at face value, implies a period of annual price deflation in H2 2025 / H1 2026. The judgement here is to downplay this possibility and regard the current monetary signal as directional rather than giving strong guidance about levels.

It is possible that the stock of money is still above an “equilibrium” level relative to nominal GDP. The current ratio is below its 2000-19 trend but in line with the 2010-19 trend, and higher than at end-2019 – chart 3. There may still be “excess” money to act as a deflation cushion.

Chart 3

The forecast of a target undershoot requires services inflation – an annual 4.2% in August – to break lower. The price expectations balance in the EU services survey has displayed a (loose) leading relationship with annual services inflation historically, with the current reading consistent with a move down to about 2.5% in H1 2025 – chart 4.

Chart 4

The “double dip” downturn in global manufacturing continued last month.

Global manufacturing PMI new orders fell steeply from a peak in May 2021 to a trough in December 2022 (first dip), with a subsequent recovery ending in May 2024. The second dip was confirmed by a sharp fall to below 50 in July, with the index unchanged in August – see chart 1.

Chart 1

As the chart shows, an alternative global indicator based on national surveys weakened further last month.

The alternative indicator implies a shorter interim recovery between the two dips than the PMI, starting from May 2023 and ending in January 2024. These timings align better with turning points in global six-month real narrow money momentum (low in June 2022, high in December 2022) – chart 2.

Chart 2

The September 2023 low in real money momentum suggests that the double dip will bottom out by end-2024.

A key issue is whether manufacturing weakness will now transfer to services.

Services indicators remain mixed. The global services PMI new business index regained its May high last month and is close to the pre-pandemic average – chart 3.

Chart 3

Order backlogs, however, fell further and are well below the corresponding average, as they are in manufacturing – chart 4. The decline suggests that current output is running above the (increased) level of incoming demand.

Chart 4

Accordingly, services firms are curbing hiring, with the sector employment index falling sharply in August and almost as weak as in manufacturing – chart 5.

Chart 5

Rises in the global services PMI activity and new business indices last month partly reflected further strength in US components. The corresponding measures in the US ISM services survey are weaker, however, especially relative to pre-pandemic averages – chart 6.

Chart 6

The PMI surveys continue to support the expectation here of rapid easing of services price pressures and likely inflation undershoots by H1 2025. Output price indices for consumer goods and services remain close to their 2015-19 averages, a period when G7 annual core CPI inflation averaged 1.6% – chart 7.

Chart 7