The Fed’s quarterly financial accounts provide information on sector money trends and funds flows. Several features of the Q4 accounts, released last week, are noteworthy.

First, net retirement of equities by non-financial corporations (via buy-backs and cash take-overs) reached a record dollar amount ($270 billion) in Q4, confirming that corporate buying was a key driver of the year-end rally – see chart 1.

Chart 1

The rise in equity purchases followed strong growth of non-financial business broad money holdings in the year to end-Q3, discussed in a previous post. Such holdings, however, contracted slightly in Q4, pulling annual growth down from 10.6% to 6.2% – chart 2.

Chart 2

Financial business money holdings had surged in the year to end-Q1 2023, perhaps partly reflecting cash-raising related to equity market weakness in 2022. These balances were run down during H2, though still finished the year slightly higher than at end-2022.

The recent weaker trends in non-financial and financial business money suggest less buying support for equities and other risk assets going forward.

Household broad money, by contrast, rose solidly in Q4, resulting in the annual change returning to positive territory. The ratio of money holdings to disposable income recovered slightly following six consecutive quarterly declines, remaining above its pre-pandemic trend, in contrast to shortfalls for corresponding Eurozone and UK ratios – chart 3.

Chart 3

The Q4 financial accounts also contain initial estimates of corporate profits and gross domestic income (GDI). Profits after tax adjusted for stock appreciation and economic depreciation rose at a 2.5% annualised rate last quarter and remain below a peak reached in Q3 2022 – chart 4, blue line. The range-bound movement is consistent with S&P 500 earnings data and questions perceptions of economic / profits strength.

Chart 4

GDI is an alternative estimate of GDP and has consistently lagged the headline expenditure-based measure in recent quarters – see previous post. It did so again in Q4, rising at a 1.9% annualised rate versus headline GDP growth of 3.2% - chart 5. GDI grew by just 1.2% in the year to Q4.

Chart 5

US monetary conditions eased during H2 2023, reflecting the Treasury’s decision to skew debt issuance towards bills and the Fed’s December pivot. This loosening is now reversing, partly because of the recent sticky inflation scare and associated back-up in yields, and prospectively as the Treasury scales back bill financing in Q2.

January monetary statistics are consistent with a turnaround. The narrow M1A measure followed here contracted by 1.4% on the month, more than reversing a 1.0% December gain. Broad money M2+ stagnated after a 0.8% December rise*.

Six-month M2+ growth appears to be rolling over in line with the forecast in a previous post – see chart 1. To recap, sales of Treasury bills to money funds should continue to offset the monetary impact of the Fed’s QT during Q1 but the Treasury’s plans to redeem bills in Q2 imply a dramatic contractionary shift – unless the Fed simultaneously halts QT.

Chart 1

Prospective monetary weakness poses a threat to risk assets and could coincide with economic news that derails the current soft / no landing consensus. This consensus has been bolstered by a recent pick-up in the ISM manufacturing new orders index, a widely-watched cyclical indicator. A post in July signalled a coming ISM rebound but suggested that it would prove temporary.

That remains the base-case view here. A relapse is expected in reflection of global real narrow money weakness into last autumn and on the view that the 2022-23 stockbuilding cycle downswing has yet to reach a final low.

US six-month real narrow money momentum has led swings in ISM new orders historically. The currency component has displayed a slightly stronger correlation than the aggregate, probably because of a linkage with retail goods spending – chart 2. Real currency momentum signalled the current ISM recovery but has been moving lower since last summer. January retail sales weakness may have been more than weather-related and the ISM recovery may be about to abort.

Chart 2

*M1A = currency in circulation plus demand deposits. M2+ = M2 plus large time deposits at commercial banks and institutional money funds.

Chinese monetary statistics for January suggest that policy easing is starting to become effective.

Six-month growth of narrow money, as measured by true M1*, rebounded from a negative December reading to its highest level since May – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Q1 numbers can be volatile because of New Year timing effects, so improvement needs to be confirmed by February / March data.

True M1 can be broken down into “private” and “public” sector components. The former aggregates currency in circulation and demand deposits of households and non-financial enterprises. The latter is calculated as a residual and is dominated by demand deposits of government departments and organisations.

Six-month growth rates of both components rose in January but the public sector increase was much larger, consistent with funds being mobilised to boost fiscal spending – chart 2.

Chart 2

Progress in implementing fiscal stimulus is also suggested by a strong rise in central government deposits – these are excluded from money definitions but deployment of funds will have a positive monetary impact.

The broader M2 measure continues to outpace narrow money, with six-month growth little changed in January, extending a recent sideways movement. In terms of the “credit counterparts”, domestic credit expansion has firmed since late 2023 but there has been an offsetting increase in non-monetary funding (“other liabilities”) – chart 3.

Chart 3

A reduction in the broad / narrow money growth gap driven by narrow acceleration is usually a positive economic signal, indicating a rise in broad money velocity.

The January narrow money recovery, as noted, partly reflects implementation of fiscal spending plans. A sustained pick-up requires monetary policy to be sufficiently accommodative. Recent developments are promising. PBoC lending to the banking system grew by a record amount in Q4. Banks’ excess reserve ratio rose to 2.1%, the highest since Q4 2020 – before the recent 0.5 pp further reduction in the requirement ratio. The reserves injection has contributed to three-month SHIBOR reversing half of its August-December rise since the start of the year – chart 4. Currency weakness has remained contained despite softer rates; indeed, the JP Morgan effective index has risen slightly year-to-date.

Chart 4

Monetary deterioration into late 2023 argues for economic weakness through H1 2024. Confirmation that monetary trends have turned would suggest improving prospects for H2.

*Official M1 plus household demand deposits. M1 conventionally includes such deposits but they are omitted from the Chinese official measure for historical reasons.

Six-month core CPI momentum has returned to a target-consistent level in the Eurozone and UK, with January readings of 2.1% and 1.9% annualised respectively*. US momentum is significantly higher, at 3.6% – see chart 1. What explains this gap?

Chart 1

One answer is that the US CPI is overstating core pressure. The six-month increase in the Fed’s preferred core PCE measure was 1.9% annualised in December. Assuming a monthly rise of 0.4% in January (the same as for core CPI), six-month momentum would firm to 2.4% – still little different from Eurozone / UK core CPI readings.

The stronger rise in the US CPI than the PCE index reflects a higher weighting of housing rents and a faster measured increase in “supercore” services prices.

Perhaps reality lies somewhere between the two gauges, i.e. the stickiness of US core CPI momentum is at least partly genuine. If so, the US / European divergence may be explicable by monetary trends in 2021-22.

Previous posts highlighted the close correspondence between the slowdowns in Eurozone and UK six-month CPI momentum and profiles of broad money growth two years earlier. Chart 2 updates the UK comparison to incorporate January CPI data.

Chart 2

UK and Eurozone six-month broad money momentum peaked in summer 2020 and had returned to the pre-pandemic range by late 2021. This is consistent with the reversion of six-month headline and core CPI momentum to target-consistent levels around end-2023.

US broad money momentum followed a different path, with a more extreme surge in summer 2020, a return to earth in H2 2020 and a secondary rise in H1 2021, driven partly by disbursement of stimulus checks in December 2020 and March 2021 – chart 3.

Chart 3

The sharp fall in US six-month money growth during H2 2020 was echoed by a slowdown in CPI momentum into end-2022 – much earlier than occurred in the Eurozone and UK. More recent CPI stickiness may reflect the lagged effects of the secondary monetary acceleration into mid-2021.

What does this suggest for absolute and relative prospects? The judgement here is that broad money growth of 4-5% pa is consistent with 2% inflation over the medium term. US six-month money momentum crossed below both this range and UK / Eurozone momentum in May 2022, reaching an eventual low in February 2023, at a weaker level than (later) lows in the UK / Eurozone.

Assuming a two-year lead, this suggests that US six-month core CPI momentum will move down to 2% around mid-2024 on the way to a larger (though possibly shorter) undershoot than in the UK / Eurozone.

*Eurozone = ECB seasonally adjusted CPI excluding energy and food including alcohol and tobacco. UK = own measure additionally excluding education and incorporating estimated effects of VAT changes, seasonally adjusted.

UK real money contraction warned of 2022 economic stagnation and 2023 recession. Weakness has abated but real money measures have yet to resume expansion, casting doubt on hopes of a sustainable economic recovery.

The latest ONS numbers are consistent with a recession having started in Q2 2023. Among key features of the GDP release:

• Gross value added (GVA) at basic prices peaked in Q1 2023, falling by 0.03% in Q2, 0.16% in Q3 and 0.34% in Q4.

• The cumulative decline in GVA / GDP of 0.5% between Q2 and Q4 is inconsistent with a description of the economy as “flatlining”.

• Similarly, claims that the consumer has been holding up are no longer tenable given a 1.0% cumulative contraction in household consumption between Q2 and Q4.

• GDP / GVA fell by 0.2% and 0.3% respectively in the year to Q4, meeting a stronger recession definition than the two-quarter rule (in contrast to Japanese GDP also released today).

• Nominal as well as real GDP fell in Q4, with the GDP deflator rising at a 2.0% annualised pace between Q2 and Q4.

The suggestion of cyclical peak in Q1 2023 is supported by the LFS employment measure, which reached a high in the three-month period centred on March. (The LFS aggregate is 10% larger than the PAYE employment series, reflecting coverage of self-employment.) Aggregate hours worked also peaked then, falling 1.5% through November.

Real money measures began to contract in H2 2021. GDP stagnated from Q2 2022, consistent with the usual lag. The six-month rates of decline of real narrow and broad money reached a peak in March 2023, warning of H2 economic contraction – see chart 1.

Chart 1

Six-month real money momentum has recovered significantly but has yet to turn positive. Slowing inflation has been a key driver, while nominal broad money is no longer contracting. Economic weakness may abate in H1 2024 but current monetary trends appear inconsistent with a meaningful recovery. Early rate cuts are urgently required to limit still-significant downside risk and head off an extended inflation undershoot.